\u3cem\u3eWashington v. Glucksberg\u3c/em\u3e Was Tragically Wrong by Chemerinsky, Erwin
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 106 Issue 8 
2008 
Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong 
Erwin Chemerinsky 
Duke University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501 (2008). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol106/iss8/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WASHINGTON V GLUCKSBERG WAS
TRAGICALLY WRONG
Erwin Chemerinsky*
Properly focused, there were two questions before the Supreme
Court in Washington v. Glucksberg. First, in light of all of the other
non-textual rights protected by the Supreme Court under the "lib-
erty" of the Due Process Clause, is the right to assisted death a
fundamental right? Second, if so, is the prohibition of assisted
death necessary to achieve a compelling interest? Presented in this
way, it is clear that the Court erred in Washington v. Glucksberg.
The right of a terminally ill person to end his or her life is an essen-
tial aspect of autonomy, comparable to aspects of autonomy that
the Court has protected in decisions concerning family autonomy,
reproductive autonomy, and autonomy to engage in sexual activity.
Moreover, the government's general interest in protecting life and
preventing suicide has far less force when applied to a terminally ill
patient. The tragedy of Washington v. Glucksberg is that every day
across the country, terminally ill patients are being forced to suffer
longer and being denied an essential aspect of their autonomy and
personhood.
INTRODUCTION
Fourteen years ago, in the spring of 1993, my father was dying of termi-
nal lung cancer. Near the end of his life, he was in the hospital, far too weak
to get out of bed or even to shave. Except when sedated, he was fully con-
scious and completely rational. He completely understood that he was in the
last days of his life and that he would never get out of that hospital bed. I
stood next to him as he asked a doctor to administer drugs to end his life. He
cogently explained to the doctor that either he was awake and in great pain
or he was drugged into unconsciousness. He told the doctor that it was his
time to go and there was no point in prolonging his life a few more days. No
one in my family objected to his choice.
The doctor brusquely said, "I can't do that," and quickly changed the
subject. My father, though, was persistent and again asked the doctor to give
him enough morphine to stop his breathing and end his suffering. The doc-
tor said that the law did not allow that and that he would not discuss it
further.
My father died four days after making that request. I will never under-
stand what interest the State of Indiana, where he was in the hospital, had in
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keeping him alive for those few additional days. He was awake for increas-
ingly short intervals and while awake he complained of great pain. The
tumor had blocked circulation to his arm and it was grotesquely swollen. He
did not see any point in having an amputation since he was about to die. He
told the doctor that at that stage it did not matter to him whether he died of
gangrene from the death of tissue in his arm or from the lung cancer.
I cannot approach the topic of physician-assisted suicide without con-
fronting the vivid image of my father pleading with a doctor to help him
stop suffering. The prohibition of physician-assisted suicide affects those
like my father who are not on life support and are physically too weak to
commit suicide. Those on artificial life support can order it ended.' Those
with the physical ability to do so can commit suicide, albeit with far greater
trauma to their family and loved ones. But a person like my father, who des-
perately wanted to end his suffering, was left with no alternatives.
Thankfully, he only lingered for a few days after his request; but there are
many terminally ill patients who suffer for months because of the lack of a
right to death with dignity.
Three years after my father died in 1993, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc ruling, found that the right to privacy
included a right to physician-assisted suicide. In a lengthy and carefully rea-
soned opinion by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the court, in a seven-to-four
decision, ruled in favor of terminally ill patients in the State of Washington
who were challenging the law prohibiting aiding or abetting a suicide. Al-
most simultaneously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found that a similar New York law violated equal protection.3
A year later, the Supreme Court reversed both of these decisions and
emphatically rejected any constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
The majority opinion in each of these cases was written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred in the judgment.
There were no dissents.
In this Article, I argue that the Supreme Court was wrong, tragically
wrong, in its decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. As I
assess these cases and assisted death, there are two questions to be an-
swered. First, should the right to privacy under the Constitution, which had
been recognized in prior cases, be interpreted to include a fundamental right
to assisted death for terminally ill patients? Second, if so, is the prohibition
of assisted death necessary to meet a compelling government interest?
1. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), the
Court "assumed," and five Justices expressly found, that there is a right to refuse medical treatment
under the Due Process Clause. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
2. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 E3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
3. Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
4. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill, 521 U.S. 793.
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The Supreme Court's crucial error was in failing to recognize that the
prohibition of assisted death infringes a fundamental aspect of the right to
privacy. Thus, the Court used only rational basis review, rather than strict
scrutiny. Had it applied the latter, it should have found that none of the gov-
ernment's alleged interests met the demanding requirements of strict
scrutiny.
The tragedy of the Supreme Court's decision is that countless other in-
dividuals in my father's situation needlessly suffer every day across the
country. They are denied the most basic aspect of their autonomy: the power
to decide to end their life with dignity and on their own terms.
In Part I, I explain why the Supreme Court was wrong in failing to find
that a fundamental right was implicated. In Part II, I describe why laws pro-
hibiting assisted dying for terminally ill patients fail strict scrutiny.5
I. LAWS PROHIBITING ASSISTED DEATH INFRINGE
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
There are two key steps to the argument that laws prohibiting assisted
death infringe the right to privacy. First, the Constitution protects fundamen-
tal aspects of personal autonomy, even though privacy and these rights are
not enumerated in the Constitution. Second, the right to assisted dying-a
right to die with dignity-is a core aspect of the personal autonomy pro-
tected under the Constitution's right to privacy.
The first step is controversial, but as a constitutional matter, not difficult.
Conservative Justices consistently maintain that there is no right to privacy
protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in the text and was
not intended by the framers. 6 But long before the Supreme Court considered
physician-assisted suicide, it held that privacy is protected as a fundamental
right under the Constitution, and it safeguarded many aspects of autonomy
as fundamental rights. For example, the Court has expressly held that certain
aspects of family autonomy are fundamental rights and that government
interference will be allowed only if it withstands strict scrutiny. These liber-7 8
ties include the right to marry,7 the right to custody of one's children, the
5. My focus, like that of the Supreme Court in Glucksberg and Quill, is on the right to
physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients. In Part 11, I consider whether this inevitably
would mean a right to physician-assisted suicide in other contexts.
6. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disput-
ing any constitutional protection for the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disputing constitutional protection for the right to
refuse medical treatment).
7. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (speaking of a fundamental right to mar-
riage).
8. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) ("[A] natural parent's desire
for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an inter-
est far more precious than any property right." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and '[r]ights far more precious ... than property
rights.'" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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right to keep a family together,9 and the right to control the upbringing of
one's children.'0 Similarly, the Court has recognized a right to reproductive
autonomy, which includes the right to procreate," the right to purchase and
use contraceptives, and the fight to abortion."
Unless the Court intended to overrule all of these decisions, it was clear
at the time of Glucksberg that the Constitution was interpreted as protecting
basic aspects of personal autonomy as fundamental rights even though they
are not mentioned in the text of the document. Put another way, the Court
never has adopted the originalist position of Justices like Scalia and Thomas
that the Constitution's meaning is limited to its original meaning. 14 As I and
others have argued elsewhere, and there is no need to repeat here, there are
compelling reasons to reject an originalist approach to the Constitution.
Moreover, scholars have developed persuasive arguments as to why privacy
is worthy of constitutional protection as a fundamental right.
In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion formulated an
approach to identifying fundamental rights that is at odds with the Supreme
Court's approach in its earlier privacy cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
that "we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "'v Further, he gave decisive
weight to history and tradition:
9. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (declaring it unconstitu-
tional for a zoning ordinance to keep a grandmother from living with her two grandsons who were
first cousins).
10. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
11. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a
state law that mandated involuntary sterilization of those convicted three times of crimes involving
moral turpitude).
12. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
13. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Moreover, conservative Justices seem quite willing to depart from the original meaning
of a constitutional provision when it conflicts with their ideology. For example, conservative Jus-
tices interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring colorblindness by the government. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). But it is clear that
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially based on the actions of the
Congress that proposed it, was to allow race-conscious government actions, especially to benefit
minorities. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 570-87 (1998) (describing the actions of the
Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987); Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
16. For a superb defense of the right to privacy as a fundamental right, see Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989).
17. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit
it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted
"fight" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty in-
terest protected by the Due Process Clause.'"
However, this assumption that a fundamental right exists only if there is
a tradition of protecting it is wrong both descriptively and normatively. De-
scriptively, the Court has been willing to protect rights even though there
has not been a tradition of protection. For example, laws prohibiting interra-
cial marriage were far more "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" than the right to interracial marriage, but in Loving v. Virginia, the
Court held that such a right is protected by the Due Process Clause.' 9 And
there was no deeply rooted tradition of protecting a right to abortion before
Roe v. Wade. In fact, abortion was illegal in forty-six states when Roe was
decided.2 °
Of course, conservatives can argue that is why these decisions were
wrong. But that misses the point: Chief Justice Rehnquist purports to de-
scribe how the Court has acted in determining whether an unenumerated
right is protected by the Constitution. His description is inaccurate. There
could be a different discussion about whether the Court should protect such
rights, but as a descriptive matter, he is just wrong in saying that due process
is limited to protecting those rights that are "objectively, 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.' ,,2
Although this formulation is familiar and often uttered, it does not re-
flect the non-texual rights protected by the Court, especially under the rubric
of privacy rights.
Normatively, the fact that laws have long existed does not answer the
question as to whether the interest the laws regulate is so integral to person-
hood as to be worthy of being deemed a fundamental right. Oliver Wendell
Holmes expressed this well:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
22persists from blind imitation of the past.
Indeed, the Court's subsequent decision in Lawrence v. Texas23 provides
strong support for Justice Holmes's point. In Lawrence, the Court invali-
dated laws prohibiting private, consensual homosexual activity, even though
such statutes had existed throughout American history. Contrary to Chief
18. Id. at 728.
19. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion
Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 107, 109 (1982).
21. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
22. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,469 (1897).
23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Justice Rehnquist's approach in Glucksberg, the Court in Lawrence pro-
tected a privacy right even though it was not based in the text, the framers'
intent, or tradition. The methodology of Lawrence, which affirmed a right to
privacy based on its being a crucial aspect of personhood, cannot be recon-
ciled with Chief Justice Rehnquist's restrictive view of rights under the Due
Process Clause.
Thus, it is the second step in the analysis that is key: is the right to phy-
sician-assisted suicide so fundamental to autonomy that it should be deemed
a fundamental right? Put another way, is it sufficiently analogous in its im-
portance to the privacy rights which the Court has previously protected that
the right should be worthy of being deemed a fundamental right?
It was striking that not one of the nine Justices on the Court made this
argument. Four Justices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-wrote
concurring opinions to emphasize that laws prohibiting physician-assisted
24suicide might be unconstitutional as applied. But none of the Justices ar-
25gued that there should be a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide.
The Ninth Circuit, however, did raise precisely this argument. In its en
banc ruling striking down the Washington statute prohibiting aiding and
abetting a suicide, the Ninth Circuit persuasively explained why privacy
should be seen as including a right to death with dignity:
Some argue strongly that decisions regarding matters affecting life or death
should not be made by the courts. Essentially, we agree with that proposi-
tion. In this case, by permitting the individual to exercise the right to
choose we are following the constitutional mandate to take such decisions
out of the hands of the government, both state and federal, and to put them
where they rightly belong, in the hands of the people. We are allowing in-
dividuals to make the decisions that so profoundly affect their very
existence-and precluding the state from intruding excessively into that
critical realm. The Constitution and the courts stand as a bulwark between
individual freedom and arbitrary and intrusive governmental power. Under
our constitutional system, neither the state nor the majority of the people in
a state can impose its will upon the individual in a matter so highly "cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy." Those who believe strongly that
death must come without physician assistance are free to follow that creed,
be they doctors or patients. They are not free, however, to force their
views, their religious convictions, or their philosophies on all the other
24. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
25. It is interesting to speculate as to why not. In part, it may be a reflection of the composi-
tion of the Court. I believe, though I cannot prove, that William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall,
William Douglas, or even Harry Blackmun would have argued differently. The Court at the time of
Glucksberg did not have (and does not have today) a liberal in the mold of these earlier Justices.
Moreover, the failure of any Justice to urge such a fight is a reflection of the influence of the
conservative attack on unenumerated rights. The conservatives' relentless drumbeat against privacy
rights has had an effect, even though it is inconsistent with numerous precedents and is based on a
thoroughly criticized approach to constitutional interpretation.
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members of a democratic society, and to compel those whose values differ
with theirs to die painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths.26
The Ninth Circuit is correct: if privacy means anything, it is the right of
individuals to have the autonomy to make crucial decisions concerning their
lives. The Supreme Court has protected these crucial decisions in a human
being's life by recognizing rights such as the right to marry, the right to raise
children, and the right to reproductive autonomy. Certainly, the choice of
whether to live or to die is of equal importance. Indeed, it is difficult to im-
agine any aspect of autonomy more basic than the ability to choose whether
to continue one's life. If any aspect of autonomy is to be deemed fundamen-
tal, surely it is the right to choose to die. It is important to recognize that this
is the type of reasoning courts always engage in, looking to prior decisions
and deciding whether the current matter is sufficiently analogous. In
Glucksberg, the essential question-and one not faced by the majority-was
whether the right to assisted death is comparable in its importance in a per-
son's life to other aspects of liberty already protected.
This conclusion is further supported by the opinions in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health.27 Under Cruzan, those who are on life
support have the right to have it ended. In other words, they have the right to
assisted dying under the Constitution. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Cruzan declared that "for purposes of this case, we assume that
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitu-
tionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.""
Although the majority opinion only "assume[d]" that there was a right to
refuse food and water to bring about death, five Justices in Cruzan-Justice
O'Connor, concurring, and the four dissenting Justices-said that such a
right exists. Justice O'Connor began her opinion by saying, "I agree that a
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions . .. and that the refusal of artificially deliv-
ered food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest."29 Justice
Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
said that there is a "fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutri-
tion and hydration." ° And Justice Stevens, who also dissented, described the
case as involving "constitutional interests of the highest order."'"
In other words, five Justices in Cruzan clearly found that there is a
fundamental right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment. As
the following analysis will show, this is in substance a right to
26. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 839 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (citation omitted).
27. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
28. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
29. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 344 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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physician-assisted suicide for any patient who is on artificial life support.
But those not on artificial life support are denied this right.
In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court said that there is a distinction be-
tween withdrawing treatment and administering drugs to end a person's life.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the overwhelming majority of state leg-
islatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and withdrawing
or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by pro-
hibiting the former and permitting the latter."2 Yet, on reflection, this line is
anything but clear. Both involve affirmative acts by physicians. Turning off a
respirator, removing a feeding tube, stopping medication that keeps a per-
son's blood pressure at a level to sustain life; all are affirmative acts. Both
are intended to end a person's life-and both will have that effect. The
Rehnquist argument invokes a familiar distinction between omission and
commission, but this distinction is inapposite here because ending treatment
and administering substances to end life are both acts of commission with
the same purpose and effect.
The conclusion that assisted dying is a fundamental right does not make
state laws that prohibit aiding and abetting a suicide per se unconstitutional.
But it does say that they should be allowed only if they survive strict scru-
tiny. This qualification is crucial because the level of scrutiny is key to
determining the constitutionality of a law. The Supreme Court in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg used only rational basis review because it concluded that
there was not a fundamental right.33 Similarly, in Vacco v. Quill, the Su-
preme Court rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claim on the ground
that there was not a fundamental right and proceeded to apply rational basis
review.1
4
The Court's approach cannot be reconciled with the many prior Supreme
Court cases protecting unenumerated rights as fundamental. If there is con-
stitutional protection for autonomy, as there has been since the early
twentieth century, then there must be a fundamental right to death with dig-
nity as well. And once a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide is
recognized, the key question, under either due process or equal protection
analysis, is whether the government meets strict scrutiny: are laws prohibit-
ing physician-assisted suicide necessary to achieve a compelling interest?
II. LAWS PROHIBITING ASSISTED DEATH FAIL STRICT SCRUTINY
The State of Washington in Glucksberg and the State of New York in
Quill asserted a number of interests to support their laws prohibiting aiding
and abetting a suicide. The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court each ad-
32. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804-05 (1997).
33. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
34. Quill, 521 U.S. 793. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "New York's statutes outlawing
assisting suicide affect and address matters of profound significance to all New Yorkers alike. They
neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications. These laws are therefore
entitled to a 'strong presumption of validity.'" Id. at 799-800 (citations omitted).
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dressed six specific interests: "(1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3)
avoiding the involvement of third parties and use of arbitrary, unfair, or un-
due influence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones; (5) protecting
the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding future movement
toward euthanasia and other abuses."35 On careful examination, both the
Washington law and the New York law fail strict scrutiny.
First, the states asserted that they have an interest in preserving life. In
Cruzan, the Court stated that "we think a State may properly decline to
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may
enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life. 36 The Court in Glucksberg quoted this statement: "Washington has an
'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.' The State's prohibi-
tion on assisted suicide, like all homicide laws, both reflects and advances
its commitment to this interest.
'3 7
Undoubtedly, in the abstract, preserving human life is a compelling gov-
ernment interest. But context is crucial. The question is whether the state
has a compelling interest in prolonging lives of terminally ill patients who
wish to die. A terminally ill patient, by definition, will die relatively soon.
With terminally ill patients, denying physician-assisted suicide likely will
mean that the person stays alive additional days, weeks, or at most months.
With non-terminally ill patients, denying assisted dying will mean that the
person likely will live many more years or even decades. Thus, a distinction
can be drawn based on the difference in the state's interests. Moreover, the
Supreme Court, Washington, and New York had all previously recognized
that their interest in preserving life was not sufficient to prevent people from
terminating medical treatment, which would end their lives. Thus, the ques-
tion is not whether, in general, the state has a compelling interest in
protecting human life. Rather, the inquiry must be more specific: in light of
the constitutional and statutory rights to stop medical interventions so as to
end a person's life, does the state have a compelling interest in prolonging
the life of a terminally ill patient against his or her wishes?
Put this way, the government's interest is far weaker. I never have under-
stood what interest was served in keeping my father alive for several more
days after he clearly and unequivocally expressed the desire that his suffer-
ing end. The Ninth Circuit explained this well:
As the laws in state after state demonstrate, even though the protection of
life is one of the state's most important functions, the state's interest is
dramatically diminished if the person it seeks to protect is terminally ill or
permanently comatose and has expressed a wish that he be permitted to die
without further medical treatment (or if a duly appointed representative has
done so on his behalf). When patients are no longer able to pursue liberty
or happiness and do not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing
them to remain alive is clearly less compelling. Thus, while the state may
35. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 n.20 (1997).
36. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282.
37. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
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still seek to prolong the lives of terminally ill or comatose patients or, more
likely, to enact regulations that will safeguard the manner in which deci-
sions to hasten death are made, the strength of the state's interest is
substantially reduced in such circumstances .
Second, in writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the
government's interest in preventing suicide:
Relatedly, all admit that suicide is a serious public-health problem, espe-
cially among persons in otherwise vulnerable groups....
Those who attempt suicide-terminally ill or not-often suffer from de-
pression or other mental disorders .... Thus, legal physician-assisted
suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect depressed or
mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from
suicidal impulses.3 9
But again, the Court states the issue at too high a level of abstraction.
The question is not whether the state has an interest in preventing suicide;
obviously as a general matter it does. Instead the question is much more
specific: does the state have a compelling interest in preventing terminally
ill patients from being assisted in their death? Phrased this way, the argu-
ment collapses into the prior point that the state has a compelling interest in
safeguarding life.
There is a danger that people will use assisted death out of temporary
depression. This is why it is a much more troubling issue as to whether the
right should extend beyond the terminally ill. The autonomy argument for
physician-assisted suicide would seemingly justify all individuals having
such a right. But the state unquestionably has more of an interest in prevent-
ing the suicide and protecting the life of a person who is not terminally ill.
Indeed, in such circumstances the state's interest is quantitatively different
in terms of the length of life that is being extended, and likely qualitatively
different in terms of the nature of that life. The issue, though, in Washington
v. Glucksberg was just as to whether terminally ill individuals had the right
to assisted dying. The state has no meaningful interest in preventing assisted
death of a person suffering terribly from a terrible disease. In fact, as ex-
plained above, states already allow assisted dying by such individuals if they
are on artificial life support.
Moreover, Judge Richard Posner has argued that "permitting physician-
assisted suicide ... [in] cases of physical incapacity might actually reduce
the number of suicides and postpone the suicides that occur."4 The Ninth
Circuit paraphrased his conclusion:
[A]ssuring such individuals that they would be able to end their lives later
if they wished to, even if they -became totally physically incapacitated,
38. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 820 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
39. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730-31.
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 244 (1995).
1510 [Vol. 106:1501
Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong
would deter them from committing suicide now and would also give such
people a renewed peace of mind.... [S]ome of those individuals would
4!eventually commit suicide but others would decide never to do so.
Judge Posner suggests that there might be another situation, besides for the
terminally ill patient, where physician-assisted suicide should be recog-
nized: a person facing a debilitating disease that denies them meaningful
quality of life. This, too, is a hard question, but one that the Court did not
need to resolve in Washington v. Glucksberg.
The third interest identified by the government is in protecting the integ-
rity of the medical profession. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "The State
also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical pro-
fession.... [T]he American Medical Association, like many other medical
and physicians' groups, has concluded that '[p]hysician-assisted suicide is
fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer.' ,,42
But it is not clear why this rises to the level of a compelling government
interest. Each doctor can and would decide for himself or herself whether to
assist a person in dying. Recognizing a constitutional right to assisted dying
would not keep doctors from deciding whether and when to participate.
There is a constitutional right to abortion, but no doctor is ever required to
perform an abortion. Also, the argument is based entirely on an inapposite
definition: the doctor's role is to be a "healer." But that does not help in
dealing with situations where there is a terminally ill patient and no healing
to be done. In such situations, isn't the doctor's primary role to reduce suf-
fering, to make the patient as comfortable as possible? In this situation,
then, physician-assisted suicide advances the central goal of the doctor.
This argument also ignores the extent to which doctors already partici-
pate in assisted dying. Some do this by ending essential medical care. Others
may prescribe heavy doses of sedatives knowing that they will hasten the end
of their patients' lives. A constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide will
provide regulation for this practice. The summer that Glucksberg was decided,
I participated in a debate over it with a doctor. He said that there were nu-
merous instances in which he had administered drugs to alleviate pain
knowing that the amount provided would end the person's life. Yet he also
argued that protecting the medical profession required prohibiting physi-
cian-assisted suicide. He did not see what to me was an obvious tension in
his position. He believed that doctors already can and do provide physician-
assisted suicide, so there was no need for the law to do so. This point, how-
ever, undermines not only the concern for protecting the medical profession
but the entire case against allowing assisted dying. If doctors already do this,
and unquestionably they do, then surely it is better that it be covered by
rules and procedures? Moreover, shouldn't all terminally ill patients have
the opportunity for the exercise of this option? Also, again, once doctors are
allowed to engage in assisted death by removing life support, there is no
41. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824 n.98 (citing POSNER, supra note 40, at 243-53).
42. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
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reason why protecting the medical profession needs to be protected from
what the plaintiffs in Glucksberg were requesting.
Fourth, the Court said that the government has an interest in preventing
vulnerable individuals from being pressured into ending their lives. The
Court explained:
[T]he State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mis-
takes.... We have recognized ... the real risk of subtle coercion and
undue influence in end-of-life situations.... If physician-assisted suicide
were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families the substan-
tial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs.
43
This is a serious concern, but the question must be whether the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in preventing everyone from exercising a
right to physician-assisted suicide because some might be pressured into
ending their lives earlier than they wish. The analogy to abortion rights is
apt. Recognizing a right to abortion might make some women, especially
poor women, feel pressured into having abortions. But the Supreme Court
has recognized that it is the right of each woman to decide whether to have
an abortion. By the same reasoning, a competent adult with a terminal ill-
ness should not be denied the right to physician-assisted suicide because
some other individuals will make poor choices because of pressure and in-
fluence.
Indeed, the same concern can be raised about the right to refuse medical
care. A person could choose to terminate treatment because of pressure from
family members or to reduce their emotional or financial burdens. Notwith-
standing this concern, the Court recognized a right to refuse medical care in
Cruzan." There is no reason why the concern is weightier or more powerful
in the context of physician-assisted suicide.
Besides, if the concern is pressure, the solution should be to lessen the
risk of pressure, not to prohibit assisted dying. And if the government is
concerned that individuals might feel pressure to save their families from
large expenses, then the government should ensure that the costs of medical
care are adequately covered.
Finally, the Court accepted the State of Washington's argument that "the
State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to
voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia' 45 Yale Kamisar has per-
suasively made this argument.4 The Court invoked the experience in the
Netherlands, where it said that a study found 4,941 cases where physicians
43. Id. at 731-32.
44. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
45. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
46. Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 735 (1995); Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die": On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DuQ.
L. REV. 481 (1996).
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administered lethal morphine overdoses without the patients' explicit con-
sent. 7
But this argument has the same problems as all other arguments against
the existence of a right because that right might be abused. It has all the
problems of a typical "slippery slope" argument. To recognize a right to as-
sisted dying for competent, terminally ill patients does not as a matter of
necessity lead to a right to physician-assisted suicide for others. Lines can
be drawn. For instance, the right can be limited to terminally ill patients. As
explained below, Oregon law in allowing physician-assisted suicide by ter-
minally ill patients has drawn exactly this distinction for over a decade.
I recognize that the autonomy arguments for physician-assisted suicide
for terminally ill patients also can be used to justify a right to physician-
assisted suicide for non-terminally ill patients. If a terminally ill patient has
the right, why not a person with a medical condition that causes unremitting
pain but that will not hasten the end of the person's life? Why limit this to
physical conditions; what of the person who is devastatingly depressed and
wants to end his or her life in a way least likely to impose on family mem-
bers? If a person's autonomy includes the right to end one's life painlessly
and with the aid of a physician, why doesn't every competent adult have this
right?
These are serious and troubling questions, but answering them does not
require rejecting a right to assisted death for terminally ill patients. It cer-
tainly is possible to draw a line and conclude that a terminally ill patient is
different because his or her death is reasonably imminent. A terminally ill
patient, by definition, will lose much less of his or her life through physi-
cian-assisted suicide than would a non-terminally ill patient who commits
suicide.
The Court should not deny a fight to some because others might abuse
it. Freedom of speech can be used to impose great pain and social harms, yet
that is not a reason for censorship. The right of parents to control the up-
bringing of their children might lead to physical abuses beyond the reach of
the law. But these inevitable abuses are not reasons to deny the existence of
the parents' right.
Moreover, there now has been a decade of experience in Oregon with le-
gal assisted death. The Oregon experience provides powerful refutation of
this and many of the arguments against assisted dying. Oregon law allows
physicians to prescribe, but not administer, medications that can be used to
end life. Several requirements must be met before a physician-assisted sui-
cide can be carried out:
The law requires that a person requesting a prescription for lethal medica-
tion: 1) is an adult; 2) is capable; 3) is a resident of Oregon; 4) "has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suf-
fering from a terminal disease"; 5) "has voluntarily expressed his or her
wish to die"; and 6) "make[s] a written request for medication for the
47. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734.
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purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in ac-
cordance with [Oregon Revised Statutes Sections] 127.800 to 127.897.""4
The Oregon statute prescribes a number of steps that must be followed
and which are designed to minimize the risk of abuse. The Oregon Depart-
ment of Human Services describes them as follows:
[ 1.] The patient must make two oral requests to his or her physician, sepa-
rated by at least 15 days.
[2.] The patient must provide a written request to his or her physician,
signed in the presence of two witnesses.
[3.] The prescribing physician and a consulting physician must confirm the
diagnosis and prognosis.
[4.] The prescribing physician and a consulting physician must determine
whether the patient is capable.
[5.] If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a psy-
chiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a
psychological examination.
[6.] The prescribing physician must inform the patient of feasible alterna-
tives to assisted suicide, including comfort care, hospice care, and pain
control.
[7.] The prescribing physician must request, but may not require, the patient
to notify his or her next-of-kin of the prescription request.
49
The Oregon law gives the lie to the dire predictions of the State of Wash-
ington and the Supreme Court. The initiative required data collection and, as
of the end of 2005, only 246 Oregonians had been assisted in suicide. ° A
study of the first decade of implementation found that "[flew complications
have been reported from Oregon's assisted suicides; a result inconsistent
with data from the Netherlands. 51 Another commentator noted that
"[a]lthough the risks of coercion and abuse of the vulnerable are real, Ore-
gon's experience demonstrates that such harms have not materialized.
Contrary to the suggestion of opponents, the use of [physician-assisted sui-
cide] remains limited and controlled, with no sign of being
disproportionately chosen by or forced upon the vulnerable.
52
The Oregon experience shows that procedural safeguards can prevent
the abuses that the Court was concerned about in Glucksberg. Put in the lan-
48. Kurt Darr, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 40 J. HEALTH
L. 29, 39 (2007) (alterations in original) (quoting the Death with Dignity Act § 2.01, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.805 (2005)).
49. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS.,
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 7-8 (2006), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/year8.pdf.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Darr, supra note 48, at 43 (footnote omitted).
52. Lindsay N. McAneeley, Comment, Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Labora-
tory to the State of Hawai 'i, 29 U. HAW. L. REv. 269, 292 (2006) (footnote omitted).
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guage of strict scrutiny, prohibiting all physician-assisted dying is not neces-
sary in order to prevent the abuses.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the question in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v.
Quill-and today-is whether the issue of assisted dying should be left to
the political process or decided by the courts. The Supreme Court took the
former position in Washington v. Glucksberg and, in fact, recently upheld
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.53
Why not leave this to the political process? First, as I argue above, the
Constitution should be interpreted as including a fundamental right to phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Protection of fundamental rights is not left to the
political process.
Second, it is notable that although Oregon adopted its death with dignity
initiative over ten years ago, no other states have copied this. One possible
explanation is that people oppose physician-assisted death for terminally ill
patients. Interestingly, though, that is not what opinion polls show. The
Ninth Circuit cited public opinion at the time its decision was handed down
in 1996:
Polls have repeatedly shown that a large majority of Americans-
sometimes nearing 90%-fully endorse recent legal changes granting ter-
minally ill patients, and sometimes their families, the prerogative to
accelerate their death by refusing or terminating treatment. Other polls in-
dicate that a majority of Americans favor doctor-assisted suicide for the
terminally ill. In April, 1990, the Roper Report found that 64% of Ameri-
cans believed that the terminally ill should have the right to request and
receive physician aid-in-dying. Another national poll, conducted in Octo-
ber 1991, shows that "nearly two out of three Americans favor doctor-
assisted suicide and euthanasia for terminally ill patients who request it." A
1994 Harris poll found 73% of Americans favor legalizing physician-
assisted suicide.54
Why then has the political process not acted accordingly? I think that the
answer is found in the same reason why the vast majority of Americans do
not have living wills even though they have strong feelings about what they
want done for them in a dire situation. A living will is something easy to put
off. Thankfully, there seems no urgency. Creating a living will requires
thinking about one's own mortality. These same human tendencies explain
why the political process has not, and likely will not, provide a right to phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Maybe, too, those who think about it assume that
they will have a sympathetic doctor who will obey their wishes.
53. In Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), the Court held that the U.S. Department of
Justice is not authorized under the Controlled Substances Act to block implementation of the Death
with Dignity Act.
54. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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But my father's situation reflects that often people don't have those
choices. He did not confront the issue until he was far too weak to end his
own life; then, the doctor treating him would not consider my father's re-
quest.
Every competent adult facing a terminal disease should be able to die
with dignity. The Supreme Court was wrong in Glucksberg and Quill, and
countless individuals and their families have suffered from these decisions
ever since.
